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NOTES
CORPORATIONS - STOCKHOLDER'S DERIVATIVE SUIT - RATIFICATION
OF FRAUD. One of the most notable and controversial fields in the
law of corporations is the stockholder's derivative suit. Before courts
of equity made this remedy available, a stockholder whose interest
was impaired by some act or inaction on the part of the corporate
directors, had no remedy at law. Law courts refused to countenance
the action, reasoning that as a corporation is a separate entity, any
injury flowing from directors' conduct was an injury suffered by the
corporation, which alone could maintain the suit. To alleviate this
situation, equity courts reluctantly took cognizance of the aggrieved
shareholder's position and allowed him to bring the action.'
Perhaps the first formal recognition of the remedy came in Foss
v. Harbottle," a famous English decision, which allowed the plaintiff
to sue on behalf of and for the company in an action against certain
of its directors. Once the way was opened for this type of action,
the derivative suit rapidly gained widespread recognition in the
courts. In 1855, the Supreme Court of the United States stated
that the jurisdiction of equity in this class of suits was no longer
doubted.-' Today the derivative suit is a well established remedy and
is especially prevalent in Delaware, New Jersey, New York and
Pennsylvania.
Although the remedy may be invoked in other fact situations,
it is typically used: (1) where some action or threatened action on
the part of the board of directors or trustees of the corporation
exceeds their authority; (2) where the directors, or a majority of
them act in their own interest to the corporation's detriment; (3)
where the majority of the shareholders acts oppressively or illegally;
or, (4) where fraud by the directors will result in serious injury to
the corporation.4
The possibilities for abuse, latent in the derivative suit, are
proliferous. For example: The capricious plaintiff may be acting
as a puppet for a rival corporation.' Armed with an inconsiderable
interest the shareholder may unconscionably attempt to assert the
1. "A shareholder's derivative suit is an invention of the courts of equity and is
recognizable only in equity and cannot be maintained at law." Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F.
Supp. 432, 441 (N.D. Ia. 1946); Felsenheld v. Block Bros. Tobacco Co., 117 W. Va.
167, 192 S.E. 545 (1937).
2. 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch. 1848).
3. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856).
4. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
5. Forrest v. Manchester S. & L. Ry. Co., 4 De G. F. & J. 125, 45 Eng. Rep. 1131
(Ch. 1861); See Gen. Inv. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 88 N.J. Eq. 237, 102 Atl. 252
(1917).
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full rights of the corporation.' A party might institute suits, not to
redress actual wrongs, but to capitalize upon their nuisance
valuer by holding out for a private settlements or purchase by
the corporation of his shares at an inflated price.9 Even the most
dubious claims have a high nuisance value because they are time
consuming, bring adverse publicity, and are costly to the corpora-
tion.10 These possibilities of abuse have led to the imposition of
stringent prerequisites to a plaintiff's right to maintain the action.
REQUIREMENTS FoR SUIT
The court in Foss v. Harbottle was exceedingly strict in laying
down the conditions precedent to the commencement of a share-
holder's suit. The court said that in order for the suit to be in-
stituted it must be shown that the corporate authorities have been
requested to act and, that a demand for action has been made to
the majority of stockholders.
The theory underlying the demand upon the management is
that the right to vindicate corporate injuries rests in the board
of directors, and that they must be given an opportunity to en-
force the corporation's rights before anyone else may assume to do
so: The effort on the part of the shareholder to induce action by
those in control of the corporation must be more than a perfunctory
demand; it must be made in earnest" and, in addition, must allow
the directors a reasonable time in which to act.1 2 However, if cir-
6. A few cases have indicated that a plaintiff will not be permitted to bring a stock-
holder's suit if his holdings are so small as to fall within the maxim de miimus non
curat lex. Danmeyer v. Coleman, 11 Fed. 97, 101 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (dictum); Wag-
ner Elec. Corp. v. Hydraulic Brake Co., 269 Mich. 560, 562, 257 N.W. 884, 886 (1934)
(dictum). See note, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1309 (1934).
7. Suits brought with little probability of success have been defined as strike litigation.
"A' 'strike suit' is an action brought by a security holder, not in good faith, but through
the exploitation if its nuisance value, to force the payment of a sun disproportionate to
the normal value of his interest as the price of discontinuance." Note 34 Colum. L. Rev.
1308 (1934).
8. Dresdner v. Goldman Sach Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N.Y. Supp.
360, 368 (1934) (dictum); Pollitz v. Wabash .R. Co., 167 App. Div. 669, 152 N.Y.
Supp. 803, 814 (1915) (dictum).
9. Manufacturer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of R. I. v. Hopson, 176 Misc. 220, 25 N.Y.S.2d
502 1940), Aff'd, 262 App. Div. 731, 29 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1941), Afi'd, 288 N.Y. 668,
43 N.E.2d 71 (1942) (Stock purchased at 7 times its value). See also Stevens, Corpo-
rations §149 (2d. ed. 1949).
10. E.g., Winkelman v. Gen. Motors, 48 F.Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). (Suit brought
by minority shareholders took several months to try at a cost of $800,000 to Gen. Motors).
11. Bacon v. Irvine, 70 Cal. 221, 11 Pac. 646 (1886); Montgomery Light Co. v.
Lahey, 121 Ala. 131, 25 So. 1006, 1007 (1898) (dictum).
12. Bartlett v. New York, N. H., & H. R., 221 Mass. 530, 109 N.E. 452, 455 (1915)
(dictum). (Bill was filed 7 days after demand had been made. The court stated, ".
such notice was entirely too short in time for any practical purpose.")
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cumstances clearly indicate that a demand would be impractical or
useless, it is generally held unnecessary. 3
Among the situations that have been held to obviate the necessity
for demand are those where the directors have been guilty of
misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust,14 where the wrongdoers
are in control of the corporation," where there has been collusion
between the directors and the majority of shareholders, 0 or where
the majority is in sympathy with the directors.' If the plaintiff
feels that demand is unneccessary he must set forth in the averments
of his bill facts sufficient to show the futility of the requirement. 8
If the demand for redress made upon the directors is refused,
the plaintiff must then request the other shareholders to take
action."9 The rationale of this requirement is that when the
directors refuse to act, a majority of the stockholders should be
allowed to take action in their stead. This demand is in the nature
of an intracorporate appeal from an adverse decision by the man-
agement. Like the requirement of demand on the management, the
appeal to the shareholders is not a rigid one; consequently, a
good faith attempt or a showing of the futility of such a request
will suffice. Courts in this country disagree as to the reasonableness
of requiring an appeal to the shareholders, some authorities con-
* sidering it unreasonable and impractical in view of the expense and
delay involved.
2 1
The court in Hawes v. Oakland-22 succinctly stated the prere-
qisites to the institution of a derivative suit:
"Before the shareholder can bring an action in his own name
he should show to the satisfaction of the court that he has
13. See, e~g., Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 Mo.
App. 185, 30 S.W.2d 976 (1930); Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99
N.E. 138 (1912); note, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 453 (1931) (Discussion of conditions pre-
cedent to stockholder's derivative suit).
14. Del. & Hudson Co. v. Albany & Susquehanna By., 213 U.S. 435 (1909).
15. See, e.g., United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S.
261 (1917); Montgomery Light Co. v. Lahey, 121 Ala. 131, 25 So. 1006 (1898); Pencile
v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 74 Minn. 67, 76 N.W. 1026 (1898.).
16. Montgomery Traction Co. v. Harmon, 140 Ala. 505, 37 So. 371 (1904).
17. Witter v. LeVeque,,244 Mich. 83, 221 N.W. 131 (1928).
18. Facts showing that he has complied with this condition must be set forth in un-
mistakable terms in the plaintiff's bill. E.g., Bartlett v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 221
Mass. 530, 109 N.E. 452 (1915); Katz v. New Eng. Fuel Co., 135 Me. 467, 199 Atl.
274 (1938).
19. See note 13 supra.
20. Unless there is adequate reason to the contrary the plaintiff.must make an honest
attempt to convince the shareholders that the action ought to be instituted. See, e.g.,
Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y.
7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912); Bathbone v. Parkersburg Gas Co., 31 W.Va. 798, 8 S.E. 570
(1888).
21. Tobelman v. Mokan, 41 F.Supp. 334, 339 (1941) (dictum); Slutzker v. Bieber,
132 N.J.Eq. 406, 28 A.2d 525, 527 (Ch. 1942) (dictum). See also Ballantine, Corpo-
rations §146 (rev. ed. 1946); note, 6 U. Chi. L. Rev. 269 (1939).
22. 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
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exhausted all the means within his reach to obtain, within
the corporation itself, the redress of his grievances, or actions
in conformity to his wishes."
The court went on to say that the stockholder must also allege
that he was a shareholder at the time the transaction of which he
complains occurred, or that his shares have since devolved on him
by operation of law. This latter limitation on the plaintiff's right
to bring the action has been incorporated in section 23 (b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-' and in the laws of several
states.2 4
Even in face of these restrictions, the use of the derivative suit
has flourished, causing states where the action has been most
prevalent to adopt additional requirements in at attempt to curb
increasing abuses of the remedy.25 The New York Legislature, for
example, has authorized judicial tribunals to require that security
for the defendants' expenses be posted by a plaintiff holding less
than five per cent of the aggregate par value of the outstanding
stock, unless the value of his shares exceeds fifty thousand dollars.26
Similar statutes have been enacted by other states.
2 7
RATIFICATION AND NONRATIFICATION
The doctrine of ratification is a limitation some courts have
adopted to frustrate the result of the derivative suit. Stated briefly
the doctrine provides that certain acts even though .ulra vires or
fraudulent, may be ratified by a "disinterested majority" of the
shareholders..28
Multiple ramifications attend the simple proposition that ultra
-vires or fraudulent acts may be ratified by the stockholders and
23. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23(b), 28 U.S.C.A. (1948) (This rule first appeared as
Equity rule 94 in 1882 and later, in 1912, became Equity rule 27).
24. Ky. Rev. Stat. §271.605 as amended 1946 L. c. 141; Mich. Gen. Corp. Law §10
as amended by Act 209, Pub. Acts 1947; Mo. R.S. Ann. §847 19(b) as amended in
1945. See note 27 infra.
25. See note 27 infra.
26. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law §61-b. See Cohen v. Beneficial Securities Co., 337 U.S. 541
'(1949) (Statute's constitutionality affirmed).
27. Cal. Gen. Corp. Law §834 (1954) (Defendant may request security from plaintiff
upon proper motion to court); Md. Laws c. 989 (1945); N.J. Stat. Ann. (1946 Supp.) tit.
14 §3, added by N.J.L. 1945 c. 131; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 §1322 (1954) (5% ownership
with no alternative based on dollar value and no provision for decreasing the amount of
the bond); Wis. Stat. 180.13 (1949) (No action by holders of less than 5% of shares of
any class unless based on conduct resulting or intended to result in personal advantage to
one or more directors or one or more shareholders). See note, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 799
(1946) for application of this type statute to the small shareholder.
28. Kessler v. Ensley Co., 123 Fed. 546 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1903): Mountain States Pack-
ing Co. v. Curtis, 86 Colo. 355, 281 Par. 737 (1929) (Ratification of a fraudulent tran-
saction by shareholders, after a full discussion and by a large majority was conclusive);
Claman v. Robertson, 164 OQhio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955) (A disinterested majority
of the shareholders of a corporation have the power to ratify directors' fraud provided there
is no actual fraud in either inducing or effecting such ratification).
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subsequently approved by a judicial body. The necessity of adopt-
ing a line of demarcation to guide directors and stockholders in
their conduct, and the impossibility of defining that point are
equally evident.
"The rule of ratification was no sooner enunciated than exceptions
were grafted to it which seriously confined its scope. Thus, it has
been stated that the ratification will be set aside upon a showing
by the plaintiff that any of the following facts exist: (1) The
majority of stockholders was induced to ratify by fraud;2 1 (2) the
majority was under the control of other influences which swayed
it from making a fair and impartial judgment;31 (3) the ratifica-
tion evinced such recklessness and negligence that it amounted to
bad faith;31 (4) the ratifying majority was not a distinterested
majority; 2 or, (5) a great percentage of the votes of the majority
ratifying was obtained through proxy without full disclosure.13 It
should be noted that the determination of the existence of any of
these facts must always lie within the province of the court. Because
these exceptions involve subjective judgments, a group attempting
to ratify, even though acting honestly, can never be certain that a
court will not view its action as encompassed by an exception. It
may only anticipate the court's action; thus it acts in a doubtful area
- a twilight zone - subject always to being reversed by a court
at the instance of a dissenting minority shareholder's suit. The
majority cannot be certain that litigation will not result from their
conduct, and yet proponents of the rule of ratification claim that its
chief virtue is the prevention of suits by minority groups.3"
Other reasons advanced to support the ratification rule are that
to adopt any other rule would in some instances result in more in-
jury to the corporation than it would suffer if the transaction com-
plained of was allowed to stand,', or that if ratification is not allow-
29. Mountain States Packing Co. v. Curtis, 86 Colo. 355, 281 Pac. 737, 739 (1929)
(dictum).
30. Kessler v. Ensley Co., 123 Fed. 546, 558 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1903) (dictum).
31. Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429, 435 (1955) (dictum).
32. Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 712 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818 (1941); Gamble
v. Queens County Water Co,, 123 N.Y. 91, 25 N.E. 201 (1890).
33. Hyams v. Hecla Min. Co., 221 Fed. 529 (6th Cir. 1915); Berendt v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp; 108 N.J.Eq. 148, 154 Atl. 321 (Ch. 1931).
34. Advocates of the doctrine state that to adopt any other rule would encourage
nuisance litigation. See Kessler v. Ensley, 123 Fed. 546 (C.C. N.D. Ala. 1903); Claman
v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 432 (1955); Landstrom, Ratification By
Maiority Stockholders-A Problem in Corporate Democracy, 31 B.U.L. Rev. 165, 172
(1951).
35. E.g., Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955) (Directors,
who purchases the stock at $27.50 per share, argued that if the stock was now worth less
than the price paid for it, the corporation would suffer a pecuniary loss by recission. This
possibility of loss would seem unlikely, however, because the plaintiff contended that at
tge time o sale the stock had a market value of approximately $200 per share).
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ed, control of the corporation is transferred from the majority of
shareholders to a dissenting minority.36 It is submitted that these
reasons tend more to discredit the nonratification rule than to sup-
port the ratification doctine.
Whatever the merits of the ratification rule may be, most courts
refuse to sanction it in relation to fraud, preferring instead to allow
any stockholder to come into court, show that a fraud has been
perpetrated, and have it set aside. The theory that fraud may not be
ratified, even by a disinterested majority, is called the "nonratifica-
tion rule."17 Proponents of the rule contend that allowing ratifica-
tion of fraud carries the fundamental concept that the majority
should rule the affairs of the corporation to such an extreme that
it should not be the controlling factor. Although reasons in support
of the rule are seldom advanced by the courts, it is undoubtedly
based on public policy. Often a court will bottom its decision on a
breach of the fiduciary relationship existing between the directors
and the minority group"8 or between majority and minority stock-
holders. 30 This idea was iterated by Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v.
Salmon :40
"Many forms of conduct permissable in a workday world
for those acting at arm's length are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something sticter that
the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard.
of behavior. . .Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude
of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular
exceptions."
When placed on this basis the courts term the breach fraudulent
and incapable of ratification short of unanimous condonation.4
Other courts reason that adoption of any other attitude would
allow a majority to work any kind of "rascally scheme" or fraud
36. "We do not believe that in such a case the power of effective decision shifts from
a majority to a minority of the stockholders." Solomont & Sons Trust v. New England
Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241, 249 (1950).
37. Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955).
38. "A majority of the stockholders cannot ratify acts of corporate officers, so as to cut
off the rights of minority stockholders, where such acts are a fraud or abuse of the trust
confided to the officers." Hodgeman v. Atlantic Refining Co., 300 Fed. 590, 599 '(D.C.
Del. 1924); Ford v. Ford Roofing Co., 285 S.W. 538, 540 (Mo.App. 1926) (dictum).
39. "The majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary
relation toward the minority, as much so as the corporation itself or its officers and di-
rectors." Southern Pac. Ry. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487 (1919); Mitchell Inv. Co. v.
Republic Steel Co., 63 F.Supp. 323, 328 (N.D. Ohio 1944) (dictum).
40. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 ,546 (1928).
41. Dana v. Morgan, 219 Fed. 313, 314 (S.D. N.Y. 1914), aff'd. 232 Fed. 85 (2d Cir.
1916) (dictum); Endicott v. Marvel, 81 N.J.Eq. 378, 87 Atl. 230, 233 (Ch. 1913)
(-dictum).
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upon a minority.4 2 One court stated simply that, ". . . it is im-
possible to ratify a fraud and make that good which is vicious from
the foundation." 2 Very often a court will characterize the action
complained of as something other than fraud and will strike it
down on the theory that it was ultra vires or illegal.44 In these
cases the doctrine of nonratification of fraud is not involved.
Reasons advancedt in favor of allowing a minority stockholder
to bring a' derivative suit may be applied with equal soundness
to support the doctrine of nonratification. Certainly the rule has
accomplished much in policing the corporate system and in pro-
tecting the corporate ownership from management. By
educating corporate directors in the principle of fiduciary res-
ponsibility the rule has undobtedly prevented the diversion of
large amounts of capital from stockholders to management and
outsiders. The deterrent effect the rule has on directors toying with
fraudulent schemes should not be underemphasized.
One of the chief arguments advanced in opposition to the non-
ratification rule is that its adoption renders every fraudulent act,
however inconsequential, a potential source of litigation. There
seems to be no reason to presume, however, that litigation is mater-
ially deterred by adherence to the ratification rule, in that ratifica-
tion is apparently not a bar to plaintiff's suit where fraud has been
alleged.4 6 Nevertheless it is true that unqualified application of
the nonratification rule would have the same effect of encouraging
litigation. To meet this objection, statutes have been enacted to
limit the parties' right to bring suit.4 In addition, the court may
determine that the action complained of was not fraudulent, but
rather was the exercise of good "business judgment" that went
awry. Further, if the defendant can show that the plaintiff partici-
42. See, e.g., Dana v. Morgan, 219 Fed. 313 (S.D. N.Y. 1914), aff'd. 232 Fed. 85
(2d Cir. 1916); Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (1938); Brewer v.
Boston Theatre Co., 104 Mass. 378 (1870).
43. Bliss v. Linden Cemetery Ass'n., 87 N.J.Eq. 494, 505, 91 AtI. 304, 308 (Ch. 1914).
44. Von Armin v. American Tube Works, 188 Mass. 515, 74 N.E. 680 (1905) (Axio-
matic that an illegal transaction entered into by board of directors cannot be ratified). See
also Fletcher, Private Corporations §5795 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1943). But see, Corbus v.
Alaska Treadwell Gold Min. Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903) (Suit by shareholder to enjoin the
directors from paying illegal tax was not upheld where cost of suit was disproportionate
with the amount of the tax).
45. Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1368, 1369 (1940).
46. See Kessler v. Ensley, 123 Fed. 546 (C.C. N.D. Ala. 1903); Solomont & Sons Trust
v. New Eng. Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950) (For a dis-
cussion of this case see Landstrom, op cit. supra note 34); Claman v. Robertson, 164"-0]aio
St. 61, 127 N.E.2d 429 (1955).
47. See note 27 supra. In addition, a plaintiff may overcome these defenses by showing
that the action complained of may fall within an exception to the rule. See notes 29-33
vrpra and text thereto.
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pated in the benefits,4" or was guilty of laches in bringing the suit,4 9
most courts will not hear the plaintiff's cause.
The foregoing defenses do not directly prevent the bringing of
suits but may indirectly deter their prosecution.
CONCLUSION
Cursory consideration of the ratification and the nonratification
rules would perhaps lead to a conclusion that they are diametrically
opposed. More critical examination, however, reveals that this
is not so.
It is evident that whether a court subscribes to the doctrine that
directors' fraud can be ratified or that it cannot be ratified, it
must make an initial characterization of the act as fraudulent, so
as to come within the application of the particular rule to which
it adheres. The transitionally nebulous concept of "fraud" has thus
far defied, and presumably will continue to defy, reasonably precise
delimitation. Consequently, courts, when making this initial char-
acterization, have wide lattitude. It is likely that this inherent
flexibility will generally be so utilized as to effect substantial
justice irrespective of the rule involved.
Even so, directors' knowledge that fraudulent acts may be
ratified can have no other result than to seriously impair the deter-
rent influence of a derivative suit and to make less confining their
scope of allowable conduct. The argument that "strike suits" are
effectively discouraged by the ratification rule is demonstrably
fallacious. Any restraint imposed by the ratification rule upon the
commencement of derivative suits is entirely indirect; it operates
not to prevent institution of the suit but merely to prevent recovery
after institution. In a true "strike" suit, recovery on the merits can
scarcely be considered the motivating factor, and if the suit is bona
fide, surely a minority shareholder's right to demand that directors
faithfully protect and advance the corporation's interests should
not be prejudiced either by a majority's determination that they
should not be protected or by the inconvenience and expenses
which might be occasioned by defending a suit to enforce it.
Interests of the corporation, its employees, its directors, its
shareholders and the ultimate interest of the public must be care-
48. Haines v. Mid-West Wholesale Grocery Co., 273 Ill.App. 595 (1933); "Courts of
Equity, in ordinary cases, will refuse relief to those suitors who do not come into equity
with clean hands, or who have ratified or acquiesced in the wrong complained of." Liken v.
Shaffer, 64 F.Supp. 432, 442 (N.D. Ia. 1946.)
49. Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F.Supp. 432, 446 (N.D. Ia. 1946) (dictum); Pollitz v. Wa-
bash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721, 726 (1912) (dictum).
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fully weighed by courts presented with questions involving ratifica-
tion of fraud. Faced with this bewildering complexity of often diver-
gent interests, it is readily apparent that robot-like application of
either rule would, if carried to its logical extreme, be both unreal-
istic and unjust. 50 Fortunately such applications are at worst in-
frequent," and in any case unnecessary.
Analysis of each rule indicates that anomalous positions may be
reached under either. The exceptions to the ratification rule have
the result of negating ratification; the defenses which may be in-
terposed to a suit brought in a nonratification jurisdiction, in effect,
allow ratification.52 Hence, in many respects the differences be-
tween the rules is more apparent than real. It is submitted, however,
that if a choice must be made, adherence to the nonratification rule
in conjunction with the coercive influence of the derivative suit will
tend to discourage managerial deviation from the path of un-
swerving fidelity, thus rendering less frequent the necessity for
judicial intervention of any sort.
Charles A. Feste
50. See notes 29-33 supra and text thereto. See also note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1368,
1375 n. 35 where the question is posed: What would a court following the nonratification
doctrine do if application of the rule would result in financial ruin to the corporation?
It is difficult to believe that any court would carry the doctrine of nonratification to such
an extreme.
51. See Clarnan v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955) (Court appeared
willing to carry the rule of ratification to the extreme of allowing stock with an alleged
value of $200.00 per share to be sold to corporate directors for $27.50).
52. See notes 48, 49 supra.
